“German women, German loyalty,
German wine and German song
Shall retain in the world
Their old, beautiful sound”
–from “Das Deutschlandleid” (1841)
Thirty-odd years ago, the Cold War seemed won. Communist regimes toppled across Europe, the Berlin Wall came down and Germany was poised on the edge of a once-unimaginable reunification.
I remember at that time calling an acquaintance in what was then West Germany, Dr. Wilfried Freiherr von Bredow. We had a brief but friendly conversation on the prospects for reunification and its aftermath. He was pleased to receive my call and I expressed my great satisfaction at such a development in and for Germany. I remember both of us being optimistic, me a bit more than him, perhaps because of the distance – who knows?
Toward the Cusp of Ruin
It hasn’t turned out as we envisioned, or as many in various places had hoped. This is not the place for a detailed history of the post-Cold War in Europe generally and Germany in particular. But there are some key points that need to be mentioned in order to appreciate why Germany today finds itself on the cusp of ruin.
The main point of departure is to recognize that after crushing and dismembering Germany during and after WWII, the US and the USSR each undertook to mold “their” respective German states into their own politico-economic image, insofar as that was possible.
Militarily, however, they diverged.The Americanization of the Bundeswehr (West German armed forces) did its utmost to erase German military traditions and customs. But the Soviets – after a brief interlude – built the NVA (East German armed forces) on classic German military lines with, of course the infusion of communist political officers and cadres. The result was that West Germany got a decent military establishment with few links to its past. The Soviets got a communist Wehrmacht .
Following reunification, many good things happened, especially in the early years. Within Germany itself, the euphoria over reunification was counter-balanced by the real cost of integrating the economically struggling East into the vibrant West. This in itself was something of a shock to the “Osties,” who had been considered prosperous within the communist bloc and were unused to being seen as poor relations.
Nor was the attitude of the US-dominated Federal Republic all that the people in the eastern states had expected. The two German countries did not really reintegrate: the more populous and prosperous West simply swallowed the East, discarding what it did not like but keeping what it had.
This was especially pronounced in the military sphere. I expect West Germans had been so thoroughly “Americanized” that they could not help being dismayed by the classic German appearance and martial attitudes of the NVA, which set the theme of the reunited Federal government: de-Germanize and re-Weimarize visibly became the two pillars of the enlarged Federal Republic.
Regional developments quickly became equally unsettling. NATO very rapidly morphed into something not envisioned in its charter, discarding its defensive posture. It not only extended its membership and influence eastwards. It also (among other things) dismembered Yugoslavia, which replaced hat would have been a once-solid block to later overland migration with a collection of weak successor states. It also played a role in Desert Storm (1990-91), in the war in Afghanistan following 9/1, had a supporting role in the 2003 war n Iraq, and in the attack on Libya (2011) which ruined that country. None of these was a defensive operation, and all combined to help produce the current misery afflicting Europe.
The last element here is the attitudes towards Russia. Following the implosion of the USSR, Russia – under an alcoholic, bumbling Boris Yeltsin – let itself be plundered by a set of mostly Jewish oligarchs and other vultures. Openness in some spheres was offset by a general crumbling in most others.
This was fine to the US and some other Western countries. Once Russia began recovering under Vladimir Putin, however, Western attitudes changed, and pro-Russian views came to be seen as a denial of both NATO and the EU. The specter of the rampant Russian bear emerged once again in both Europe and the US. These led almost inevitably to the chaos of Ukraine today.
All of these and others might have been managed within Germany except for the lengthy chancellorship of Angela Merkel (I would love to read her Stasi file – I have often wondered if she was a “sleeper”). In concert with government leaders across much of Europe, she began the unraveling of Europe and the ruin of Germany and the Germans. Her successors continued what she began, and extended it to other spheres. As one scholar recently concluded, Germany is itself implementing a suicidal policy of depopulation and re-population, de-industrialization and disarmament which was the core of the 1944 “(Henry) Morgenthau Plan for destruction of Germany.
Away from the Brink?
It is within this context that the Federal elections are taking place on 23 February 2025. Germany is essentially at the same fork in the road that other Western countries have faced, or will in the near future. Open borders, unrestricted migration with surges in crime and socioeconomic costs, mandatory and visibly self-destructive “green” economic policies, and hostility to Russia have been the path to date.
Most German political parties support most or all of these measures. One – the AfD (Alternative for Germany) – does not, and makes no bones about its strong nationalism. Founded in 2013, it rose fairly quickly to about 10% of the national vote, then doubled that in the run-up to the current election with a surge in support within much of Europe for populist,
nationalist parties generally.
Predictably, the AfD has been assailed in the media as “far right” and “neo-Nazi” for its platform: close the borders, deport (they say “remigration,” a term becoming more popular now), cease coddling migrant criminals, punish harshly gang rapists and pedophiles, support the traditional family and traditional German values, and seek friendship with Russia.
In recent months, the AfD leadership has given every indication of making a major push for a majority in the Bundestag (German national legislature) or to be the lead party in a coalition, and for its co-chair – Dr. Alice Weidel – to be Chancellor. They base this on two things, reflecting growing dissatisfaction with current affairs. One is recent national polls, showing the AfD taking outright or leading in nearly half of the voting districts. The other is the personal popularity of party Weidel, who is intelligent, articulate (I follow her speeches and interviews in German) and charismatic – something none of her rivals in other parties can match.
Therein lies the potential problem for the AfD. Dr, Alice Weidel is something of an enigma. She strongly supports the AfD platform, including traditional family values and the suppression of LGBTQ preferences and policies in public life, and does so with enthusiasm. She is also a lesbian, has a home in Switzerland with her Shi Lankan “wife” and their two adopted boys.
Interestingly enough, her AfD base does not seem to care. When polled, they overwhelmingly accept the division between her public persona and her private life, backing the former and dismissing th latter. It wouldn’t be the first time a public figure has done something like this. I expect the fact that she lives respectably in other ways and stands publicly for what her followers believe matters here, and is reflected in her personal standing.
The AfD and Germany
Nationally, The partial inconsistency between Weidel’s personal life and her public AfD party positions does add a measure of uncertainty to electoral responses. But even if it does not cost her and her party votes, I simply do not see the AfD pulling a “win” out of this election.
First, it would take an exceptional upset for the AfD to gain a clear majority in the Bundestag itself. None of the other parties has expressed a willingness to enter a coalition with the AfD, which they have tried to ban outright three time in a decade.
Moreover, all the other major parties still appear to support open borders and/or unrestricted migration – the AfD’s key plank. Coalitions can form dismissing minor issues, but not core ones.
Finally, even if the AfD does gain an electoral majority and Weidel becomes Chancellor, their problems would just be starting. Like Georgia Meloni in Italy and Donald Trump in the US (or Marine Le Pen in France, had her party won last year), Weidel and the AfD would face a large electoral bloc utterly hostile to their positions. They would expend more energy and resources on political and judicial in-fighting than on actually accomplishing anything good.
The Left everywhere may be long on ideology and short on actual accomplishments, but they are masters at throwing sand in the wheels of government. Sure, there are conservative areas in western Germany, but there is also considerable if ill-advised public support for assorted leftist causes.
So if this plays out as I expect (and I hope I am wrong), the AfD will increase its share of seats in the Bundestag and perhaps make other gains, but it will not be part of a majority or hold the Chancellorship. What then? Elon Musk was correct: the AfD is the last hope for Germany, while the path any combination of the other parties will take leads to a slow-motion catastrophe.
The only alternative I can see to accepting this dismal outcome is disunion: the re-separation of the two parts of Germany. This is not my own idea generally, it has been discussed (mostly by German speakers) on both “X” and “VK” (the Russian Facebook), and it caught my attention as the German election neared.
It should be understood at the outset that “disunion” does not automatically entail civil war. The USSR came apart with remarkably little violence. Yugoslavia was dismembered by a combination of secession and external assault. But Czechoslovakia separated peacefully into Slovakia and the Czech Republic. And there are other examples.
In the case of Germany, recent polls show a distinct separation between the AfD heartland (something more than the old East Germany) and the more “woke West.” That includes part of the old Brandenburg-Prussia. And a number of Germans writing on this topic have suggested a constitutional monarchy based on that historical reality, with the colors of the old Prussia and the participation of that House.
Is something like this feasible? I cannot say. But it seems doable. The “renewed” Germany would have more of the classic Germanic values and could rebuild its institutions based on them. It could close its borders and remigrate/deport its migrants. It could protect its women and children, no matter what the western part of the old Germany did. And of course, in keeping with its platform, it would seek good relations with Russia and other like-minded countries.
The more I reflect on it, the more I find it attractive. It would be best to save everything, but if that cannot be done, it is better by far to save something rather than lose it all.
Perhaps enough Germans of good spirit will feel the same, and make it happen. The prospect of a restored classical Germany with peaceful relations between it and Russia has a lot of appeal – and it might give some Americans an idea or three along the same lines.
Alan Ned Sabrosky (PhD, University of Michigan) is a ten-year US Marine Corps veteran. He served in Vietnam with the 1st Marine Division and is a graduate of the US Army War College. He can be contacted at [email protected]
